You are here
Home > Archive >

Power-Kill Resolves Sabres’ Shorthanded Shortcomings

The month of February was not a memorable one for the Buffalo Sabres. Sporting a 3-10-1 record over the past five weeks (which included a six-game losing streak), fans have been largely disappointed with the team’s progress or lack thereof.

In saying that, there is one facet of the Sabres’ game that improved substantially despite their poor recent record. As of right now, the Sabres have the 25th-ranked penalty-kill unit in the NHL, thwarting about 76.5% of opposing power-play opportunities. Analytically speaking, they ranked 28th in the league with a PK xGF rate of 7.79% through the first 44 games of the season.

That’s pretty bad. The good news is that this unit is improving, and rapidly so. Since the end of January, their base kill rate has increased, while their xGF rate on the PK has nearly doubled to 15.25%, which is the ninth-best mark in the league during that stretch.

This improvement begs the question – is this just a statistical aberration, or is there something the Sabres are doing differently? In reviewing the film in conjunction with the underlying data, it appears that the Sabres have finally started employing the “power kill” and it’s working.

What’s a Power-Kill?

In basic terms, a “power-kill” is a penalty-killing strategy that requires the forwards to “force the issue” by applying pressure up high (as opposed to collapsing down-low to try and take away cross-ice passes). If done correctly, this can force opposing power-play units to make hasty, sub-optimal decisions with the puck. Said decisions could also result in an increased rate of shorthanded counter-rushes.

In general, the analytics community (myself included) has advocated this approach for some time. Sabres fans were subjected to the antithesis of this approach when assistant coach, Steve Smith was running the shorthanded unit(s) under Ralph Krueger.

Look at it. Disgusting.

All four players would condense themselves down low, and get shelled with shots-against as their opponents distributed the puck with relative ease. Early in the season, that strategy seemed to have spilled over into the current coaching regime, but it’s clear that they’ve started moving toward a more aggressive strategy over the past month or so.

Examples of the Power-Kill in Action

Verbally explaining the concept is nice and all, but I’d be remiss if I didn’t provide visual examples. In perusing the past month of Sabres penalty-kill film (as much as I could access anyway), it was pretty easy to find excellent examples of the concept at work.

The most “in your face” example I found came during last week’s victory over the Minnesota Wild. If I weren’t worried about crashing the site (only half-joking), I’d have posted the entire two-minute kill here because it was masterfully done.

Right off the bat, you see Tage Thompson pestering the Wild puck-carriers as they attempt to get the rush started. In his pursuit, he causes Kevin Fiala to make a bad pass through the neutral zone. Alex Tuch notices this and disrupts the reception of the pass, forcing the puck back into the Minnesota zone.

When Tuch and Thompson come off the ice, Dylan Cozens and Rasmus Asplund replace them and pick right up where they left off. This is encouraging as it lends credence to the theory that this is a system change, and not a result predicated on a specific set of players.

Both Cozens and Asplund play a sort of rover roll, applying pressure upon whoever has the puck. This pressure allows Asplund to jump a pass attempt up high, resulting in a two-on-zero break the other way (which Cozens just misses converting).

Again, here you see the Dallas Stars struggling to get the rush started as a result of the Sabres’ shorthanded forechecking pressure. It starts with Kyle Okposo disrupting their initial attempt, followed by Cozens, who nearly buries what would have been a very flukey goal.

After they come off the ice, it’s Thompson and Tuch again, applying heavy pressure on the puck-carriers, thwarting their entry attempt and forcing them back into their end. They continue to pursue the puck-carriers in deep. You can see the Dallas players begin to get sloppy and flustered, which is the entire idea.

What I love most about this one is how the forwards cycled pressure. It wasn’t just one pressuring asset the Stars PP-unit had to worry about. It would have been easier to adjust away from the pressure if it was coming from the same opposing player. Having both forwards sort of cycling the pressure created more chaos.

I intentionally wanted to end this section with a less brazen, half-arsed example of the concept, and I found one. As you can see here, Rasmus Asplund and Cody Eakin are sort of applying the concept but appear hesitant to play it as aggressively as the other previously mentioned forward duos.

It’s still somewhat disruptive but didn’t force the Toronto Maple Leaf players into an untimely puck blunder. It did however succeed in keeping everything to the outside of the slot, forcing a relatively low-percentage shot and an easy save.

I feel that if you’re going to power-kill, you should proceed aggressively. I think this is more of a personnel thing than tactical. It could be a situation where a player like Eakin has been a “stay at home” (for lack of a better term) penalty-killer his whole career and is therefore apprehensive to get himself out of his comfort zone.

That’s speculative on my part of course, but it will be worth monitoring, especially as it pertains to players like Asplund who will likely be on the team next season as well.

Key Power-Kill Entities

As I’m sure you noticed, Thompson was featured in a few of the video examples above. His relatively recent inclusion on the penalty-kill directly coincides with the Sabres’ drastic improvement in that area. Since the beginning of February, Thompson has averaged over a minute of shorthanded ice time per game and he’s producing outstanding numbers.

Though the sample isn’t quite as large, it appears that Don Granato is using Dylan Cozens in a similar way to Cozens on one of the rotation PK forward groups. Again, we’re talking about a very small amount of minutes, but the early trends suggest that he too can excel in a power-kill role. Of the seven Buffalo forward who has served on the penalty-kill since the beginning of February, Cozens’ shorthanded xGF rate of 34.22% tops the list by a significant margin.

After watching the film, I thought Alex Tuch’s emergence might also have a lot to do with the Sabres’ overall improvement in this area. Though he certainly seems to be doing his part as a power-kill entity, his on-ice impacts while shorthanded weren’t quite as impressive as I expected them to be.

While it’s tough for any non-elite player to singlehandedly make an impact on a special teams unit, Thompson has had the most positive individual impact by far. In a year full of surprises from the 6-foot-6 centerman, his success on the top PK unit is one of the most impressive.

On the back-end, most of the Sabres defensemen have failed spectacularly as penalty-killers. The only two who aren’t cratering the team in this regard are Mark Pysyk and Robert Hagg. Though this doesn’t speak toward the Sabres’ newfound power-killing tactics, I’d be remiss if I didn’t at least give them a not for their shorthanded proclivities.

It’s also probably not a coincidence that Thompson has spent a good chunk of his PK time deployed with either one or both of them. It seems as though there is a mutually beneficial relationship there, for which Granato deserves more tactical credit.

If Thompson (or any other power-killing forechecker for that matter) overextends while pressuring up high, he has Hagg and/or Pysyk as competent entities down low to reduce the danger. A nuance to be sure, but a noteworthy one. It will be interesting to see who steps up in this regard when Hagg is inevitably traded in the coming days, but that’s a conversation for another time.

Closing Thoughts

Given the continued expansion of the Sabres’ analytics department, I do wonder if this new trend was a suggestion that came from Jason Karmanos’ team. Granato’s decision to implement this approach, basically out of nowhere, is at least curious, but most welcome.

Either way, the coaching staff’s ability to assess talent and put certain players into successful roles previously perceived as unconventional, has been a breath of fresh air. How long have we pounded our fists for the team to just try something new?

Regardless of whether or not an idea pans out, the willingness to experiment has been missing for too long, and that appears to be changing. This alone is something worth celebrating. For some of the recent flack he’s received (some of it justified, some not so much) Granato’s flexibility in this regard should make fans excited to see what he does with a more talented roster moving forward.

Charts courtesy of Hockeyviz and Moneypuck
Advanced Stats courtesy of Evolving Hockey

Photo Credit: USA Today

Top