The Buffalo Sabres have some decisions to make this summer as it pertains to their expiring restricted free-agent assets. While Sam Reinhart is certainly the headliner when it comes to debate amongst fans, Brandon Montour’s next contract is perhaps the most interesting to try and prognosticate.

According to Evolving Hockey’s contract projections (which turned out to be incredibly accurate during free agency last year), Montour’s anticipated demand will be something in the neighborhood of three years at $4.94 million AAV. When the Sabres acquired the 25-year-old prior to the 2018-19 trade deadline, that figure is pretty close to what most expected he’d eventually command. Even today, there isn’t a very vocal contingent of fans who have expressed apprehension regarding that price tag.

Perhaps there should be.

During his time with the Anaheim Ducks, Montour had some ups and downs, especially under their former head coach, Randy Carlyle. In fact, most of the Ducks’ defenders saw their metrics take a negative hit under his watch. So, when those in the analytics community questioned the acquisition, many fans brushed off his uninspiring metrics for that reason (myself included). Despite showing flashes of success down the final stretch with the Sabres in 2018-19, his numbers this season were once again very poor, resembling what he produced in Anaheim under Carlyle.

Let’s take a look at where he struggled, what he did well, and what Jason Botterill (or otherwise) should be willing to pay him as an RFA. In terms of expected-goal differential, Montour’s relative mark of -5.11 on the year was the worst among Sabres defensemen not named Zach Bogosian. It also represented the worst percentage of his career to date. His relative Corsi of -3.09-percent wasn’t a whole lot better either.

There are times where these numbers can look rough on paper, but require context in order to determine if they’re truly reflective of individual performance. Often, a defensive partner’s poor play can drag his teammates’ metrics down (see Rasmus Ristolainen and almost everyone else he’s skated with over the past four years as an example).

Unfortunately, this doesn’t appear to be the case with Montour. In fact, the numbers indicate that he’s the one doing the dragging. Of the Sabres eight most-frequently deployed defensive pairings this season, he was a part of three of the four lowest-ranking duos when it came to xGF-percentage.

While the xGA marks for these pairs where better than average, it wasn’t nearly enough to offset their paltry xGF metrics, hence the overall negative xG percentage we mentioned above. On a Sabres team that did a very nice job of suppressing chances-against in 2019-20, Montour struggled comparatively from a purely defensive standpoint in his own zone.

As a group, Buffalo allowed an even concentration of shots-against on the season, representative of the league average. When Montour was on the ice however, the Sabres allowed an additional six shots-against per hour, on average. On the surface, that’s not great, but what’s really alarming is the concentration of shots he and his respective partners allowed in the slot (widely considered a “high-danger” area).

Offensively, those same metrics were just as alarming. While Krueger’s group averaged nine fewer shots-for per-60 than average, that number went down an additional five points when Montour was on the ice.

Let’s regroup here for a minute because all of this paints a pretty damning picture. While this definitely jives with the “eyeball test” to an extent, Montour didn’t look like the most flawed asset on the back-end this season. So, why do the metrics look as bad as they do?

As we know, Ralph Krueger’s deployment techniques came under question with some degree of regularity this season. He frequently tried to jam square pegs into round holes, both offensively, and on the blue line.

In Montour’s case, the issue wasn’t so much who he was deployed alongside. While Rasmus Dahlin was the partner with whom he experienced the most success, that had more to do with Dahlin’s skill level bringing him up than the two being a good tandem fit. While Montour’s xG metrics saw improvement alongside the 19-year-old (however modest), Dahlin’s marks in that same category were reduced by over six-percent (which again, bodes poorly for Montour’s demonstrable effect on his contemporaries).

So if the issue wasn’t his pairing mates, the next place to look is situational deployment. In Montour’s case, this area does provide some relief in explaining at least a small part of why his numbers were so poor, and how he could have been better maximized as an asset.

When prompted to identify what his greatest strength is as a player, a majority of spectators would point to his transition game, and they’d be mostly correct. Though he probably gets more credit than he deserves in that area, it’s still his greatest strength.

Talented transition defensemen are often misidentified (and subsequently misused) as “offensive defensemen”. This appears to be the case here, as Montour has been used in an offensively tilted zone-deployment for most of his career. Many fail to recognize that puck-moving ability on defense doesn’t always translate to offensive zone competence, and deploying them in that fashion takes away part of their biggest strength as a player (i.e. exiting the defensive-zone and facilitating the rush).

As you can see from the chart above, while Montour’s zone-exit ability as a passer isn’t great, he’s quite good at using his speed and possession ability to carry the puck out himself. He also has a very low rate of failure (bottom right-hand section), which is obviously another positive sign.

As evidenced by the “exit attempts/60” section of the chart, he likely isn’t getting the opportunity to use that ability as frequently as he should. That’s a problem, and while an adjustment in zone-deployment won’t resolve things on its own, it would certainly help. You can also see that he excels at facilitating zone-entry (middle row), another reason why frequently starting him in the offensive zone represents a failure to maximize his skill set.

Circling back to the issue of contract valuation, it’s very tough for the Sabres to justify the aforementioned price tag, assuming that EH’s model represents something close to what he’ll command. While all of the previously explained advanced stats are great for internal evaluation purposes, until proven otherwise, they don’t come into play as it relates to contract negotiation. In that arena, base stats are still king, even for defensemen.

For comparison sake, let’s hold him up against a player with similar (albeit better), base statistics, and much better advanced metrics in New Jersey Devils blueliner, Will Butcher. After posting 30 points in 78 games during the 2018-19 campaign, the Devils extended the then RFA to a three-year contract worth $3.73 million per season. As a 24-year-old at the time, he was a year younger and had posted more points than Montour’s output of 18 (in 54 contests) this past season (assuming the season does not resume from its current suspension).

This results in a .385 and .333 point-per-game pace for Butcher and Montour, respectively. Like Montour, Butcher was also arbitration-eligible at the time. That is an important factor because if he hadn’t had that right, the Devils would have had more leverage, and the contract value may have been lower as a result.

Obviously, the Sabres probably won’t get anything done with Montour at that price. Even at an AAV of $4 million (which is the absolute highest number justifiable based on his production), he’ll likely command more, or want additional term attached to the deal (an avenue Buffalo would also be wise to avoid).

So, what’s the solution? Realistically, if there is a deal out there where another team values Montour as a piece to acquire a top-six forward in return, the Sabres brass should pursue it. Locking him down for anything that resembles three years at nearly $5 million per season would be a mistake, and if they can use him to relieve an area of excess to fortify an area of weakness, they should exploit that market (should one exist).

If there is no league interest in acquiring his rights for anything closely resembling the price Buffalo paid Anaheim for his services a year ago (sunk-cost fallacy be damned), then perhaps a short-term deal is the best approach. If Jason Botterill is indeed still making personnel decisions for the Sabres in the coming months, doubling-down on net-negative impact asset would be a mistake unless they seriously plan to revise his role next season and do a better job of capitalizing on his strengths. Given the organization’s track record of adequately evaluating their own talent, fans shouldn’t hold their breath on that outcome.

Considering Botterill’s penchant for collecting defensemen, if he actually intends to finally deal Ristolainen this summer, the thought of trading both of them in the same offseason probably sends shivers down his spine. In reality, unless there is a change in the front office, Montour will be back and it’ll likely be for more money than can be validated by his performance. Hopefully, that assessment is incorrect because the numbers simply don’t justify a significant raise from his current salary of $3.387 million per year.

Corsi, xG, and Teammate Metrics courtesy of NaturalStatTrick

Transition, Pairing, and xG Differential Charts courtesy of Charting Hockey

Shot Heatmap courtesy of HockeyViz